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Miller: Equal Taxation: A Commentary

EQUAL TAXATION: A COMMENTARY
John A. Miller*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A few years ago the smartest person in the world was asked what
she thought of our tax system.' This person, Marilyn vos Savant, replied
that it was "clearly unfair" to require some persons to pay more taxes
than others.2 In her view, one's payment of taxes is analogous to the
purchase of a hamburger.' Why, she asked, should one person pay more
than another person for a hamburger? Thus, to Ms. vos Savant,
seemingly, the fairest tax is the head tax. 5
This has immediate appeal. In Ms. vos Savant's hamburger
analogy, we hear crude echoes of Justice Holmes who once wrote,
"[taxes are what we pay for civilized society."' In Ms. vos Savant's
analogy we also hear a basic appeal to the notion of equality. If we
believe that all persons are created equal, and that we are all entitled to
equal protection of the law, should not we all pay the same price for
those rights and protections? There are difficulties, however, with
comparing tax payments with the purchase of goods. Most taxes do not
provide direct correlative paybacks. How do I measure the benefits (or
detriments) to me of all the activities carried on by the federal
government? How do I know that my neighbor and I receive the same
*

Dean and Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law.

1. See Marilyn vos Savant, Ask Marilyn, NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 10, 1994. (Parada
Magazine), at 12. According to ParadeMagazine, Ms. vos Savant "is listed in the 'Guinness Book
of World Records Hall of Fame' for '[b]ighest IQ.'" Id.
2. See id.

3. See id
4. See id.
5. Under a head tax, "one's liability is fixed v\ithout regard to an)thing one doe." Daniel N.
Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Incoe

Tax, 48 TAxL. REv. 1, 8 (1992).
6. Compafifa Gen. de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 275 U.S. 78,
100 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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benefits, especially if the benefits are measured over the course of a
lifetime? Even if we look closer to home, the problem is daunting. What
benefit does a person with no school age children derive from paying a

school bond levy?7 In the most immediate sense his or her benefits are
not as great when compared to those of us who depend on the schools to
educate our children. But arguably, even he or she benefits in some
manner from good schools. If he or she is a local employer, for example,
he or she may derive significant benefit from a well-educated
workforce.' Many people would argue that those of us who are most
secure in our property, our lives, and our prospects derive the most
benefit from government.9 Others might argue that those persons on the
dole are the real beneficiaries of government." I would simply argue that

our individual benefits from government are not wholly, or even
significantly, traceable to our contributions to it."
In the modem era, we have largely ceased to judge the equity of
taxing schemes by reference to these schemes' personal distributive
justice, that is, to their individual payback.'2 An unfortunate aspect of

this divorce of revenues from spending is that taxation has become an
almost entirely negative topic from a political perspective. How can we

draw any satisfaction from paying our taxes when we cannot correlate
our payment to some benefit except in the most general sense? To the

ordinary citizen, the field of taxation is a realm of sorrow, like crime and
punishment. 3 I do not mean to imply that this should be the case. Our

way of life depends on our government's ability to function. This ability
to function depends in turn upon its revenues. Thus, ultimately our life
and freedom depends on our tax system. Unfortunately, neither our
7. School bond levies are taxes imposed on property owners who live within the area of a
school district. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 4415 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001).
8. For a more expansive treatment of this and related points, see Maijorie E. Komhauser,
The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 465,491-97 (1987).
9. See Richard J. Joseph, Why Progressive Taxation?, 70 TAx NoTES 313, 314 (1996). But
do the rich benefit disproportionately from government? Jean-Jacques Rousseau thought so, See id.
Joseph's article provides a most accessible summary of the major theories of tax equity as they
relate to the issue of progressivity.
10. See id. at 314-15 (attributing this view to John Stuart Mill).
11. For some interesting ruminations on this issue, see Boris I. Bittker, The Erwin N.
Griswold Lecture, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 213, 221-22 (1994).
12. Richard Musgrave credits John Stuart Mill with the divorce "of tax equity from the
expenditure side of the budget." Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L
TAX J. 113, 114-15 (1990). This essay provides a pleasingly concise summary of the major themes
of tax equity literature over the past two hundred years or so.
13. See Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521, 543-46
(providing examples of taxpayers' negative views on taxation).
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politicians nor our citizens are readily open to this connection."4 The sad,
even hateful, aspects of taxation have dramatic consequences. Among

other consequences, the sorrowful nature of taxation leads our citizens to
avoid taxes like the plague and, more significantly, causes them to

conclude that morality is on their side in this endeavor.
To this bleak view of taxation we must add another factor of
importance. I refer to what John Rawls has called "[t]he fact of a

plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines." 6
Rawls was referring to something much broader than the immediate
context, but the point is as relevant to taxation as it is to other aspects of
our society. We are a diverse culture with differing philosophical, moral,

social, and religious views that influence our perspectives." We are
economically diverse as well. Some methods of taxation are more
burdensome for one group than for another. 8 Taking into account the
essentially negative nature of taxation and our pluralist society, it is

difficult to settle on a taxing scheme that is broadly acceptable. Each
person or homogenous group of persons feels it in their interest to let
someone else pay the freight. As Russell Long observed, our natural

impulse is to say to our friends, "[d]on't tax you, don't tax me, [t]ax that
fellow behind the tree."' 9

How then are we to achieve equity in taxation? Is tax equity even
possible? Or is it just whatever the person in power says it is? The most
basic criticism one may make of equity generally, is that it leaves too
much discretion to the decision maker. To believe in equity, one must
14. See id. at 523-24 (describing how from the United States' earliest da)s, political
commentators such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and William Blackstone have treated tax issues

negatively).
15. See generally id. at 526-47 (explaining why citizens believe they do not ha'e a moral
obligation to obey tax laws).
16. JoHNRAwLs, PoLItrCALLmERALsM xvii (1993).
17. But cf Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equalit. Liberty, and a FairIncome Tar. 23 F0.wI,I
URB. LJ. 607, 643-61 (1996). In this article, Professor Komhauser has persuasively argued that
Americans do share a core set of values that explains and justifies our reliance upon a mildly
progressive income tax. See id, She identifies these core values as liberty from govemmental
interference, equal opportunity, and equality based on merit. See id. at 626-37.
1S. For example, the progressive tax has been criticized as "lead[ing] to the majority l
irresponsibly voting [for] higher taxes for the minority, or 'soaking the rich.'" Komhauser, supra
note 8, at 471. Our progressive tax system is also not "marriage neutral," meaning that the tax
burden for a couple changes once they become married. See Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson
Hoynes, Explaining the Fall and Rise in the Tar Cost of Marriage:The Effect of Tax Laws and
Demographic Trends, 1984-97,53 NAT'LTAXJ. 683,683 (2000).
19. George F. Will, Morality and the 'Martini Lunch,' NEvSWEE%). Oct. 17, 1977, at 120
(emphasis omitted).
20. See e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The Chancellor's Conscience and
ConstructiveTrusts, 56 LAW & COxNMP. PROBS. 7,8 (1993).
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first believe that objective principles of moral truth exist and can be
discovered2 or at least that there is a "shared morality of the

community."' In the modem context, this faith in shared belief is more
difficult to maintain than in the past.i We are more inclined than ever

before to believe that we cannot judge objectively in a manner that takes
us outside of our own inner landscapes.

Nonetheless, in days gone by, tax theorists offered two principles
for just taxation. They contended that persons in like circumstances
should be taxed equally (horizontal equity),24 and that persons differently
situated should be taxed differently (vertical equity).' Vertical equity
was usually assumed to incorporate some element of progressivity.26 The

income tax was generally thought fairest on these counts, with

21. See, e.g., Musgrave, supra note 12, at 114 (agreeing with Louis Kaplow that tax equity
must be grounded in certain principles).
22. Powell, supra note 20, at 22. In fact, Justice Cardozo encouraged lawyers to study "the
wisdom of the past, for in a wilderness of conflicting counsels, a trail has there been blazed," Id. at
23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See id. at 27.
24. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POLICY
88 (1989). Another way of stating this principle is "[plolicies that redistribute should levy identical
taxes or provide identical transfers to all units with the same level of well-being." Robert Plotnick,
A Comparison of Measures of Horizontal Inequity, in HORIZONTAL EQUITY, UNCERTAINTY, AND
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 239, 239 (Martin David & Timothy Smeeding eds., 1985). In the
discussion that follows, I make no attempt to describe all the nuances of difference in meaning that
have been ascribed to the term "horizontal equity." The economics literature, in particular, is laden
with intricate descriptions of how we might seek to define and measure horizontal equity. See, e.g.,
A.B. Atkinson, HorizontalEquity and the Distribution of the Tax Burden, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 3, 13-18 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980). There arc also different
ethical bases on which to justify horizontal equity as a tax principle. See id. Economists also debate
whether it is an independent principle or whether it derives from other concepts, such as vertical
equity. Compare id. at 14-17 (explaining the view that horizontal equity is an independent
principle), with RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC
ECONOMY 160 (1959) (viewing horizontal and vertical equity as "different sides of the same coin"
and holding that horizontal equity is only useful when analyzed against the backdrop of vertical
equity).
25. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax Theory: Do MisallocationsDrive
Out Inequities?,in THE ECONOMICS OFTAXATON, supranote 24, at 19, 19; John B. Shoven & Paul
Taubman, Saving, CapitalIncome, and Taxation, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, supra note 24,
at 203, 204.
26. Vertical equity may be described as the principle that unequals should be treated
differently. See Bittker, supra note 25, at 19; Shoven & Taubman, supra note 25, at 204. As has
been pointed out by others, this need not require a progressive tax structure. See, e.g., Paul R.
McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontaland Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1
FLA. TAX REV. 607, 610 (1993). In practice, some degree of progressivity is often assumed to be
appropriate. See Musgrave, supra note 12, at 120. Our income tax system has employed progressive
rates from its inception more than eighty years ago. See Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 607 ("The
progressive income tax system.., was established over 80 years ago .... ").
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consumption taxation as a near rival.' In more recent years, support for
both forms of equity has declined (though not in tandem)." Indeed,
progressivity has drastically fallen from favor in some circles, though it
retains stout support in other quarters." Horizontal equity continues to
receive lip service, but in the offhand way that suggests other matters are
of more consequence?'
As I have indicated, until recently the principle of taxing equals

equally has been regarded as the first principle of taxation. Writing
about horizontal equity in 1950, Henry Simons asserted that "[e]quity in
this primary sense must, in an advanced nation, predominate over, if not

27. See Komhauser, supra note 17, at 607 (describing the progressive income tax system as
"the ideal tax" over the flat, proportionate or consumption-based tax systems).
28. See McDaniel & Repetti, supranote 26,at 620-21, 621-21.
29. See generally Komhauser, supranote 8 (discussing the arguments against progressivit));
see also Michael L. Roberts & Peggy A. Hite, Progressive Taration.Fairness,and Compliance, 16
LAW & PoL'y 27, 30 (1994) (citing one 1988 study that found that upper income taxpayers
perceived the flat tax as more fair).
30. See, e.g., Komhauser, supra note 8, at 518-23 (concluding that there is a strong argument
for progressive taxation); Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abrcu, 1,inner-Tale-All Markets:
Easing the Case for Progressive Taation, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 65-71 (1998) jadvocating the
progressive tax system). But see generally Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Tatation Revisited, 37
ARIZ. L. REv. 739 (1995) (unmasking the reasons why there is unease with the progressive tax
system). For a look at the general public's thoughts on progressivity, see Roberts & Hite, supranote
29. As one might expect, Roberts and Iite found that taxpayer support for progressisity d.clines
with increasing income. See idL
at 44.
31. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 26, at 613.
32. In some circles, equity analysis has been supplanted by ability-to-pay analysis. See. eg.,
Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equiy, 1 FLA. TAX Rov. 191, 191-92 (1992); Musgrave,
supra note 12, at 114-15. The ability-to-pay principle looks to %%hetherthe tax interferes with our
daily lives. See Komhauser, supra note 17, at 618 & n.25. Of course, any tax does this to some
extent. But an income tax or a consumption tax does this less than a head tax because a head tax that
could support the costs of government would need to be too high for some people to pay (and for
others to pay with comfort). See McMahon, Jr. & Abreu, supra note 30, at 65-66. Those persns
would be driven into poverty, a great interference indeed. The ability-to-pay principle may be
thought to encapsulate both the equality principle and the progressivity principle. Equality is
satisfied because if taxation is based on ability-to-pay, then logically, persons with equal abilities to
pay will be taxed equally. See Musgrave, supra note 12, at 115. Progressivity is satisfied under an
ability-to-pay analysis because as one's income increases so does one's ability-to-pay at a higher
rate. See id.
An additional assumption must be made in order for this to be true. That is, we must
accept as true the idea that money carries a declining margin of utility as our income grows. See id.
If we have less need for our last dollar earned than for our first dollar earned, then %%are able to
pay a higher rate of tax on that last dollar. See Kornhauser, supra note 17, at 618 (stating that "most
people agree that marginal utility [of money] declines"). But at its heart, an ability-to-pay analysis
rests on practical concerns as much as equity concerns. Ability-to-pay analysis recognizes that you
cannot get blood from a turnip, you get it from living breathing bodies. It is not simply a theory of
equity, it is a theory of revenue raising (or bloodletting). But cf.DODGE supra note 24, at 92-93
(distinguishing "material well-being" principle from the "ability-to-pay" theory). For a more
comprehensive discussion of general theories of taxation, see Komhauser, supranote 17, at 615-20.
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wholly override, all other objectives." 33 In the late 1950s, Richard

Musgrave wrote that "[p]erhaps the most widely accepted principle of
equity in taxation is that people in equal positions should be treated
equally."' Less than twenty years ago, Princeton economist Joseph

Stiglitz wrote, "so basic is the notion of horizontal equity that it is
incorporated in the Constitution of the United States in the '[E]qual

[P]rotection [C]lause. ' ' 31 Musgrave has drawn a similar comparison."
The virtue of horizontal equity as a guiding principle is subject to
challenge on several fronts. In this commentary, I address the two most
significant challenges.37 The first challenge is the assertion that equality
is an empty idea that really tells us nothing.3 The second challenge is
that market efficiencies will solve equality problems whether or not we
consciously adopt horizontal equity as the basis for formulating our tax
systems and, thus, we need not concern ourselves with equality.39 Both
of these challenges are serious and possess merit. Both challenges are
also, I believe, potentially misleading.
II.

THE EMPTY IDEA OF EQUALITY

In an article titled The Empty Idea of Equality, Professor Peter
Westen has argued with some cogency that equality "is an idea that
should be banished from moral and legal discourse as an explanatory
33. HENRY C. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 11 (1950).
34. MUSGRAVE, supra note 24, at 160; see also SIMONS, supra note 33, at 8;Michael 3.
Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV.
47, 79 (1977); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random
Taxation, 18 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 1-2 (1982). More than two hundred years ago Adam Smith put it this

way, "[tihe subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as
nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1965). There are subtleties in Smith's view of horizontal equity
such as his apparent endorsement of an income tax as the fairest tax. See id. at 779 (noting that "[all
nations have endeavoured ... to render their taxes as equal as they could contrive" both in time of
payment, proportion to revenue, and with as little burden as necessary).
35. Stiglitz, supranote 34, at 1.
36. See Musgrave, supranote 12, at 113. In light of the United States Supreme Court's recent
decision in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), this sort of comparison takes on an irony that
neither Stiglitz nor Musgrave could have intended. The essence of the state initiative at issue in
Nordlinger, Proposition 13, was the abandonment of horizontal equity in property taxation. See
John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The Supreme Court and the Property Tax, 22 HOFsTRA L.
REv. 79, 126-27 (1993). The essence of the Supreme Court's decision in Nordlinger was to hold
that the Equal Protection Clause sanctions such abandonment of horizontal equity. See id. at 124,
140-41.
37. I leave for another occasion the merits of vertical equity.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part III.
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norm." OProfessor Westen's conclusion that we should abandon equality
rests upon two propositions. First, Westen contends "that statements of
equality logically entail (and necessarily collapse into) simpler
statements of rights."4' Second, he asserts "that the additional step of
transforming simple statements of rights into statements of equality not
only involves unnecessary work but also engenders profound conceptual
confusion."4' Professor Westen was not writing in the tax context," but
tax scholars, Paul McDaniel and James Repetti, have relied upon and
echoed his views in reference to horizontal and vertical equity
Professors McDaniel and Repetti assert that horizontal equity and
vertical equity lack any normative content.45 Further, absent normative
content, they assert that these terms are largely meaningless."' They
agree that we can inject normative meaning into these terms by
assuming the existence of a particular tax structure, such as an income

40. Peter Westen, 77e Empty Idea of Equalty, 95 HARV. L REV.

537, 542 (1932t. Westen's

article has drawnm many replies. Two notable ones are Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense ofEqualiy-"A
Reply to ProfessorWesten, 81 MicH. L REV. 575 (1983) and Kent Greenawalt, How Ernpi Is the
Idea ofEquality?, 83 COLUM. L REV. 1167 (1983).
41. Westen, supranote 40, at 542.
42. Id.
43. Most of Westen's examples are drawn from the constitutional law field.
44. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 26, at 611. McDaniel and Rep.-tti prezented their
thoughts on horizontal equity as part of an effort to sound the final note in a debate beten tvo
other notable scholars, Professors Richard Musgrave and Louis Kaplow. See id. at 607. Through
several essays and over several years Musgrave and Kaplow have debated the question of the
relative importance of horizontal and vertical equity. See Kaplow. supra note 32; Louis Kaplow,
Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle. 42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989): Richard A.
Musgrave, HorizontalEquity: A FurtherNote, 1 FL". TAX REV. 354 (1993), Musgrave, supra note
12. According to McDaniel and Repetti, Kaplow takes the position that the principle of treating
equals equally derives from the principle of treating unequals differently. See McDaniel & Rep-tti.
supra note 26, at 610. In other words, Kaplow contends that horizontal equity is subsumed by the
more fundamental principle of vertical equity. See id.
at 611. Musgrave disagrees and seeks to prove
the independence of horizontal equity by reference to its widespread acceptance and by an analysis
of the trade-off between horizontal equity and vertical equity in second best settings. See id. at 613.
Both Musgrave and Kaplow accept that there is merit in analyzing tax schemes in terms of their
horizontal and vertical equity. See i& This is where McDaniel and Repetti differ with both
Musgrave and Kaplow. Using the main points of the Musgrave/Kaplow debate as a staging area.
and relying on Westen's rationale about the emptiness of equality, they downgrade the importance
of both horizontal and vertical equity. See iL (calling horizontal and vertical equity "at b.st...
surrogates to describe consistency vith or departures from the underlying decisions about the tax
base and rate structure").
45. See id.
at 621.
46. See id.
at 622. On this point McDaniel & Repetti cite Musgrave, %%honoted that horizontal
equity depends on "[a]n objective index of equality or inequality" for its incorporation into a
particular tax system. Id.at 608 (quoting RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, TIlE TiEORY OF PUBLIC
FINANcE 160 (1959)).
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tax. 47 But once we do so, horizontal equity, though present, is
irrelevant.48 This is because once we have adopted a tax on income, it
follows logically that under the rules adopted, persons with the same
income will pay the same tax. 49 From this perspective the idea of
equality adds nothing to the analysis. For this reason McDaniel and
Repetti conclude that "it is not likely that [horizontal equity] and
[vertical equity] add anything to the need to analyze tax changes in terms
of basic tax policy objectives and indeed may conceal problems or lead
policymakers astray as particular tax changes are considered.""
The conclusions offered by McDaniel and Repetti are sound in a
narrow pedantic sense. My concern is that their analysis fails to allow
for the more primitive and malevolent possibilities of human existence.
They assume a societal rationality and rule mindedness that assures
equality even without relying on the principle of equality. Belief in the
importance of the principle of equality, on the other hand, assumes that
humanity possesses a limitless propensity for persecution and
arbitrariness. It is in the context of an irrational and discriminatory world
that equality's meaning and utility stand out.
A simple example may show my point. Suppose we enacted an
income tax system that taxed all salary income based on one's salary in
the first year of employment at a particular job. As long as the same
employer employed the taxpayer, his or her taxable income could not
increase even if the taxpayer's actual salary income increased. But, if the
taxpayer changed jobs, her new salary would become the tax base until
she changed jobs again.5 Thus, if Angela, a long time executive for a
large corporation, began her career by earning $25,000 annually and ten
years later was earning $75,000, she would pay the same amount of
income tax in each of the ten years of her employment. Such a system
appears to result in gross violations of horizontal equity, since persons of
equal pre-tax salaries would be taxed unequally. For instance, suppose
Angela has a next door neighbor, Bob, who started a new job earning
$75,000 annually. While Angela was earning $75,000 and paying
income taxes computed on a salary of $25,000, Bob would be earning
$75,000 and paying income taxes computed on a salary of $75,000.

47. Seeid. at611.
48. See id. at 620-21.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 622.
51. I choose this system because, though it is fanciful, it is not beyond the pale of reason. It is
drawn by analogy to the acquisition-value property tax system employed in California. See CAL.
CONST. art. XIII A, § 2.
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Thus, even if the system employed a flat or proportionate rate income
tax, Bob would pay three times as much tax as Angela.
It seems to me that the best and most direct way to criticize the
acquisition-income tax is to argue that it fails to treat equals equally. A
tax such as I have just described should be deemed to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 2 There may be other grounds on which it could be
attacked, but its basic inequality seems as sound a ground as any for
doing so.
The inequality of the acquisition-income tax arises from the criteria
chosen for determining individual tax liabilities. McDaniel and Repetti
might argue that the notion of equality does not automatically tell us
whether a particular criteria, such as acquisition-income, treats equals
unequally. I agree with this assertion to the extent that it is a recognition
that determinations of equality or inequality depend on the exercise of
human judgment. But, I believe most persons in our society who viewed
an acquisition-income tax through Rawls' "veil of ignorance"53 would
agree that it is inequitable. Any attempt to achieve justice through the
application of law to facts involves judgments, and the difficulty of
making judgments does not make the principles we look to in making
them meaningless or unworthy of respect. 4
McDaniel and Repetti particularly warn against the use of
horizontal equity or vertical equity analysis for tax expenditures." They
reason that a tax expenditure is, in effect, a subsidy that occurs outside
of traditional tax equity analysis.5 6 That is one way to look at it. But, one
can as easily look at it from a contrary standpoint. Consider for instance,
the home mortgage interest deduction." This may be viewed as a major

52. The Supreme Court's decision in Nordlinger v. Halm, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), casts some

doubt about this. See id. at 18 (upholding the California tax scheme that taxes property at its
acquisition cost).
53. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971) ("Among the essential features of this
situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor dozs any
one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and

the like.").
54. I addressed the inescapable need for judgment in application of law in some detail in an
earlier article. See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complerity and Fairness: Justi-ing Rile
Simplificationin the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L REv. 1, 74-76 (1993).
55. See McDaniel & Repetti, supranote 26, at 621. McDaniel made this argument more fully
in an earlier article. See Paul R. McDaniel, Identification of the "Tax" in "Effccti'e Tar Rates,"
"Tax Reform" and "Tax Equity," 38 NAT'L TAX J. 273, 277-78 (1985).

56. See McDaniel & Repetti, supranote 26, at 621.
57. LR.C. § 163(a), (h)(West 2000).
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tax expenditure item." Does not equity analysis have something to say
about this item? Take, as an example, two individuals, our friends Bob
and Angela, with otherwise identical taxable incomes of $75,000

annually. Bob rents his home for $1000 per month and Angela owns her
home with a mortgage that produces $1000 per month in tax deductible

interest. Thus, if we take thirty percent as the marginal tax rate,
applicable to them both, Angela pays $3600 less in income taxes than

Bob annually. Does not horizontal equity challenge us to justify this
disparate treatment? I think it does." We may ultimately conclude that
there are good policy reasons supporting tax subsidy of home ownership

in this manner, ' but horizontal equity analysis leads us to the question of
whether this is so.

It has been asserted that horizontal equity is devoid of normative
content. 6' This is true in the sense that it does not require any particular

measure of equality. But on another level it is highly normative. 62 It says,
"Very well, you may drain me of my life's blood, ifyou are willing to
drainyour own life's blood as well." 63 There is a moral structure there. It

is the morality of vengeance, the morality of an eye for an eye. It is the
morality of Samson pulling down the pillars of the temple on his
58. This is especially true when, as is presently the case, not only is the imputcd income from
home ownership untaxed but so is the gain upon sale of the home. See id. Still, some may question
the view that the home mortgage interest deduction is a tax expenditure. See Boris I. Bittker,
Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the NationalBudget, 22 NAT'L TAX J.244, 248 (1969).
If so, this points out the inherent problem with the tax expenditure concept, which is the lack of an
agreed starting point. See id. at 248-49 (noting various ways to define tax expenditures), Arguably,
the tax expenditure concept is as devoid of meaning as is the idea of equality. That is, the tax
expenditure concept only takes on meaning after we have defined the normative structure in which
it is to operate. See id. at 248; see also Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure
Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NoTES 1661, 1661 (1992) (arguing that the concept of tax
expenditures assumes the existence of a normative rule of federal income taxation), But this does
not mean it is without value.
59. But see infra Part IfI (discussing market efficiency). If the home market has adjusted to
the tax subsidy afforded homeowners, then a case can be made that there is no inequity between the
treatments afforded Angela and Bob illustrated in the main text.
60. For example, tax subsidies for home ownership foster desirable activity and control
undesirable activity. See Feldstein, supranote 57, at 121. It may also be considered a more efficient
means of taxing individuals. See id.
61. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 26, at 610.
62. Joseph Dodge takes the view that "the horizontal equity norm in taxation is incomplete,
because it leaves unspecified the index of comparison." Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark.toMarket and Pass-Through Corporate-ShareholderIntegrationProposal,50 TAX L. REV. 265, 27576 n.42 (1995). But still, he disagrees with McDaniel and Repetti on the ground that horizontal
equity acts as a normative restraint on the utilitarian tax policy approach. See id.
63. This statement is reminiscent of "sacrifice theory." Under this principle, each taxpayer
pays a tax in an amount such that each loses the same amount of utility. See Komhauser, supra note
17, at 616-17.
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enemies and on himself. The lack of specificity leaves this moral
structure subject to uncertain interpretation. However, no value system
can escape this difficulty.
The appeal of equality is rooted in notions of suspicion and
mistrust. It arises from the capability we each possess to harm or even
kill another.6' It derives from the pain we feel upon receiving lesser
treatment than another." It derives from the threat we feel when
someone claims to himself or herself rights and rewards superior to
those we possess.65 It is predicated on the notion of limited resources and
upon the consequent sense that one person's gain is another's loss!' Our
commitment to equality is the compromise we make between our
appetites and our fears.65
This essentially negative view of equality is often supplemented by
a view of humanity's inherent social connectedness. 2 Samuel Pufendorf
called this "an equality of right, which has its origin in the fact that an
obligation to cultivate a social life is equally binding upon all men, since
it is an integral part of human nature as such." ° Whether we are rich or
poor, well kept or ill kept, we are obliged to treat each other respectfully
because our sociable natures requires this of us. "[I]f a man wishes to
avail himself of the assistance of other men for his own advantage, he
must in his turn lend his own talents to their accommodation. 'Hand
washes hand' is the old proverb." '"
Pufendorf also supports the principle of equality by reference to the
many samenesses of our span on earth' We are all subject to the whims
of fortune. Our flesh is the same, our body shapes are the same, we all
are born in the same fashion, and we all die in the same fashion." In

64. See THOMAS HOBBES, DE CWVE 45,46 (Howard Warrender ed., Oxford Univ. Pres 19331
(1642).
65. See id. at 46.
66. See hL

67. See id. at 47-48, 49.
68. See id. at 49.
69. See, e.g., SAmUEL PuFDORF, 2 DEJUIRENATuRAE Er GFtIm LtRt OCTO 330 (Jan-Brown Scott ed., C. Oldfather & WA. Oldfather trans., Owana PNbl'ns Inc. 1964) 41683).
Modem feminist legal theory develops the theme of our interconnectedness to great effect. See, e.g..
Komhauser, supranote 8, at 508-14.
70. PuFENDORF, supra note 69, at 333.

71. Id.at335.
72. See id. at 334.
73. See id. at 333-34. But cf RAwN'Ls, supra note 53. at 507 ("There is no natural feature vith

respect to which all human beings are equal... ').While Rawls viewss the basis for equality as
rooted in his concept ofjustice as fairness, he does agree that "[elquality is supported by the general

facts of nature.... Those who can give justice are owed justice." Id. at 510.
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short, in our essentials we are more alike than we are different. If this is
so, why should we not be treated alike?
Equality is also supported by reference to its venerable position in a
range of cultures. Some readers will doubtless recall the biblical
injunction, "[s]o whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to
them; for this is the law and the prophets." 74 Confucius stated the idea
this way, "do not impose on others what you yourself do not want.""
Kant's take on this was the categorical imperative, "[a]ct only according
to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should
' Aristotle expressed the thought
become a universal law."76
in this way,
we should behave to our friends "'[a]s we should wish them to behave to
us.' 77 Across the ages, and across a broad range of cultures, the equality
principle stands as a fundamental axiom for daily living. Both its
venerability and its wide acceptance have readily discernible bases in
everyday human experience. What parent has not heard the plaintive cry
of a child "It's not fair!" when favors are dispensed unequally?
While McDaniel and Repetti may be correct to assert that equality
is too crude a principle to rely upon in the details of tax policy analysis,
they are wrong to think it should be, or can be, banished from the
conversation. The equality principle is deeply rooted and cannot be
expelled from human discourse by merely naming it empty. Moreover, it
serves the limited, but crucial, purpose of checking that ordinary human
impulse to let the other person carry the lion's share of the tax burden. If
we are only able to "tax that fellow behind the tree" by imposing an
equally heavy burden on ourselves, a profound restraint may overtake
us. Since the fellow behind the tree is subject to the same restraint, an
allegiance to horizontal equity protects me from him as well as he from
me. In our society a strong allegiance to horizontal equity serves as a
way to avoid deep and abiding strife with respect to taxation. In short,
the equality principle is the key to the respectability of any taxing
scheme. The further we get away from it the more open to moral
challenges our tax laws become.
74. Matthew 7:12 (King James version).
75. THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS: A PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSLATION 189 (Roger T. Ames &
Henry Rosemont, Jr. trans., 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis White
Beck trans., 1959) (1785). Pufendorf expressed a similar idea nearly one hundred years earlier.
"And it is eminently proper that one should himself practice the law which he has set up for others."
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, 2 DE OFFICIO HOMINIS ET CIVIS JUXTA LEGEM NATURALEM LIBRI Duo
42 (James Brown Scott ed., Frank Gardner Moore trans., Oceana Publ'ns Inc. 1964) (1682).
77. 1 DIOGENES LAERTIUs: LIVES OF EMINENT PHILOSOPHERS 465 (T.E. Page et al. eds.,
R.D. Hicks trans., 1950).
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Ill. THE EFFICIENT MARKfT
A rival of equity for the hearts and minds of tax theorists is
efficiency.78 Efficiency analysis looks to overall social welfare as a
measure of a tax's virtue. 79 Thus, if it could be shown that by taxing rich
people at a lower rate than middle income people, then we could make
everyone better off;' that lower rate for the rich would be justified under
an efficiency analysis, even though it might violate horizontal equityP
Interestingly, efficiency analysis comports with Ms. vos Savant's wish
to correlate taxes with a payback. However, by focusing on agregate,
rather than individual, social welfare it ultimately fails to satisfy her
sense of fairness.
Equity and efficiency principles will often coincide! Thus, a tax
system that violates equity principles may also be inefficient. To
consider this idea, let us go back to the example of an income tax system
that taxed all salary income based on one's salary in the first year of
employment at a particular job. 3 Recall that as long as the same
employer employed the taxpayer, the taxpayer's taxable income could
not increase even if his or her actual salary income increased. But, if the
taxpayer changed jobs, his or her new beginning salary would become
the tax base until he or she changed jobs again. Thus, in our example,
Angela began her career by earning $25,000 annually, and ten years later
was earning $75,000 in the same job, but she paid the same amount of
income taxes in each of the ten years of her employment. Recall also that
Bob was newly employed with a salary of $75,000 annually. Such a
78. See Bitker, supra note 25, at 19.
79. As in other matters, I simplify things that are rather complex. For a more detailed
treatment of efficiency analysis, see McMahon. Jr. & Abreu. supra note 30. at 39-65.
80. More often this view may be expressed in the negative. That is. the superior tax is the one
that has the least aggregate welfare cost. See, e.g.. Musgrave, supra note 44. at355. 359.
81. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Conmwtutaty: Uncasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L RE:. 393.
394 (1993). The horizontal equity principle acts as a normative restraint on efficiency in such
circumstances. See Dodge, supra note 62, at 275-76 n.42 t'The ethical command that likes should
be treated alike is similar to concepts of 'rights' in imposing limits on the utilitarian approach."i. In
saying this I recognize that I am tending to muddle horizontal and vertical equity together. Some
would say that vertical equity restrains utilitarianism in the situation described in the main text. I
would argue that horizontal equity restrains utilitarianism from imposing more heavy taxes on
middle income persons than on rich persons. Vertical equity, then. would justify taxing the rich
more heavily than the middle class. For a discussion of the relative merits and importance of
horizontal and vertical equity, see the articles that reflect the Musgrave/Kaplow exchange supra
note 44.
82. This depends in some measure on what assumptions one makes about such issues as the
diminishing marginal utility of money and the impact of taxation on total proJuctisity. See
McMahon, Jr. & Abreu, supra note 30,at 32-37, 43-46.
83. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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system appears to result in gross violations of horizontal equity since
persons of equal pre-tax salaries would be taxed unequally. In our
example we noted that a flat tax rate would cause Bob to pay three times
as much tax as Angela, even though their salaries were the same.
Not only is such a scheme inequitable, it is also inefficient because
it misallocates resources relative to a tax neutral market. Any person
who has received a significant salary increase since becoming employed
would have a tax disincentive to make otherwise sensible job changes.
The size of the disincentive would deter many job changes. If the tax
rate was a flat thirty percent, Angela would pay $7500 in taxes under our
imaginary scheme.' In order for Angela to change jobs and receive any
increase in her after tax income, Angela's new job would have to pay at
least $97,000 annually." In short, she has to increase her salary by
almost $22,000 just to break even because of the tax increase she would
suffer if she changes jobs. Unless Angela is an extraordinary individual,
it seems unlikely that she will find many employers willing to hire her
away from her present employer with a salary offer that she will find
enticing. Moreover, her present employer will have an advantage in the
competition for her services since it can always offer her a greater posttax salary than its competitors at a lower pre-tax cost to itself.
But, is it possible that the misallocation of resources just described
renders moot our equity concerns? Arguably, the employment market
will correct the inequities in an acquisition-value income tax. 6 Perhaps
starting salaries will be inflated in order to compensate for the large
initial tax bite and then subsequent raises will be smaller because of the
lack of tax cost to the employee." This might result in post-tax
horizontal equity between persons of equal employment value. Thus, if
Angela and Bob are of equal employment value in a tax neutral market,
the acquisition-income market might pay Bob $97,000 pre-tax in order
to place him in the same post-tax position as Angela."8 One difficulty
84. $25,000 multiplied by 0.30 equals $7500.
85. Her present after tax income is $67,500 ($75,000 minus $7500 equals $67,500). If her
salary were $97,000 in a new job, her after tax income would be $67,900 ($97,000 multiplied by
0.30 equals $29,100, and $97,000 minus $29,100 equals $67,900). Thus, Angela would have a net
gain of $400 as a result of a $22,000 increase in her salary.
86. See Bittker, supranote 25, at 21-22 (describing how taxpayers may adjust their economic
conduct to take advantage of tax allowances).
87. A more complex market response can readily be imagined. Perhaps starting salaries would
be driven down in response to an acquisition-value income tax in order to reduce the tax cost of
labor, subsequent raises could then be greater.
88. In our example, Angela's post-tax salary is $67,500. If Bob has a pre-tax salary of
$97,000, all of which is taxable at the rate of thirty percent, his post-tax income will be $67,900. See
supranote 85.
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with this view is that the difference in employment costs to the employer
of the two employees-for example a $75,000 salary for Angela and a
$97,000 salary for Bob-may be taken as an indication that they are not
of equal value to the employer." On the other hand, Angela's employer
might be willing to pay her a salary of $97,000 but simply feels no
market pressure to do so. This lack of market pressure arises because the
acquisition-income tax prevents Angela from realizing any after tax
benefit if she changes jobs for a salary of $97,000 or less. In effect, the
tax system is subsidizing Angela's employment by her present employer
in the amount of $22,000.
What conclusions can we reach about this fanciful tax system?
First, even if the market corrects the inequity to Bob, the system still
appears inequitable. That is, Bob may compare his tax situation with
Angela's and conclude that the acquisition-income tax is unfair since his
pre-tax income is greater than hers and yet his after-tax income is the
same. Bob may believe he is being penalized for changing jobs even
though a more sophisticated analysis may show that in fact Angela's
employer is being subsidized by the tax system. Though misguided,
Bob's belief in the unfairness of the tax system may have real
consequences." For instance, Bob may develop such contempt for the
tax system that he cheats on his taxes. 9'

A second conclusion we can reach is that even if the market
corrects the initial inequity of the acquisition-income system, there is a
second level of inequity created by that correction. This is because Bob's
employer is obliged to pay more than Angela's employer for services
which we have assumed are of equal value. In general, we can say that
start-up businesses are indirectly taxed more heavily-through higher
labor costs-than established businesses?2 A fairness issue arises here
because the employers, like the employees, are taxpayers with claims to
equal treatment under the law.93 Do the market forces that arguably
89. From Bob's point of view then, the tax violates vertical equity since unequals are taxed
equally. For a definition of vertical equity, see supranote 25 and accompanying teXL
90. See generally Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Thcon,and Tar,41 UCLA L RL-v. 1861

(1994) (discussing the usefulness of cognitive theory, such as psychology, in the study of taxationI.
The confusion Bob experiences is the sort of situation that McDaniel and Repetti %anus about
with respect to using equity principles to analyze tax expenditures. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra
note 26, at 620-21.
91. See Martinez,supranote 13, at 544.

92. There is a general understanding that new companies have higher labor costs. See. e.g.,
Outback Steakhouse, Inc. Announces Fourth Quarter Earnings Outlook and Comparable Store
Sales, PR NEwswmES, Jan. 9,2001, availableat http:J//ww,,.pmewswire.com.

93. There is also an efficiency issue, of course, bcause the tax system by refusing to
recognize higher labor costs, is discouraging new business formations and expansions because it is
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eliminate the inequity at the employee level have the same effect at the
employer level?
The answer to that last question may be yes, if we take a long view
of what constitutes equity. This brings us to a third conclusion we may
offer concerning the acquisition-income taxing scheme. That is, the
market correction of the inequity, if it occurs, will occur over a
protracted time span as the start-up company matures into an established
business and as the employees of the earlier established businesses quit,
die off, or retire. This matter of timing points out the limitations of the
market as a solution for inequities in a tax system. Markets take time to
operate. Thus, an initially horizontally inequitable system will produce
some inequities that the market will not cure.94
A fourth and related point is that horizontal equity is more
appealing and more useful as a guiding principle when it contains a
visible temporal component. In other words, most of us want equality
now, not ten years from now. We would prefer a version of horizontal
equity that treats equals equally today in a way that is readily
observable.95 Perhaps this is why the general public views the sales tax
with more favor than any other tax.96 The sales tax happens every time
we make a purchase, and it applies in equal proportion to all purchases.
What is more, it is precisely equal with respect to equal purchases such
as the purchase of Ms. vos Savant's hamburger. It is the most visibly
equal of all the taxes.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The idea of equality has the momentum of centuries behind it. For
that reason alone it cannot be dismissed. It is a social fact. Additionally,
we should not do away with it as a guiding principle, even if we could
do so. It remains an ethical pole star in a sky that is fading to black.
Even so, it is true that the principle that we should treat like persons
alike provides no objective criteria for determining likeness. This lack of
criteria for determining likeness renders the principle subject to
manipulation. For example, since we are all human, one can argue that a
head tax treats like persons alike. However, we can also agree that a
millionaire is differently situated than a person living below the poverty
reducing their ability to compete with existing businesses. Similarly, the tax system is also favoring
automation over the hiring of workers (but any income tax does this to some extent).
94. See Calvin H. Johnson, Inefficiency Does Not Drive Out Inequity: Market Equilibrium &
Tax Shelters, 71 TAx NOTEs 377, 377 (1996).

95. See Komhauser, supra note 17, at 644.
96. See id.
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level. Even if the poor person could pay the same tax as the millionaire,
we can agree that their different circumstances justify making the
millionaire pay more taxes. The problem of determining relerant
likeness is a nettlesome one. But we should not exaggerate the difficulty.
All of our major tax schemes have found ways to determine likeness (or
difference) that are generally recognized as fair. 7 Gross deviations from
fair standards of likeness are relatively easy to spot.
Most tax scholars, whether they are economists or legal
academicians or both, approach tax issues with relatively little concern
for the political process." Their theories of taxation assume some degree
° This is not to say that those scholars are naive or
of purity of analysis.'O
oblivious to the influences of politics on the law of taxation. But they do
not see it as their role to factor politics into their analysis. They seek the
ideal with some knowledge of its corruptibility. The principle of
horizontal equity has an explicitly political basis. It assumes
corruptibility, venality, and partisanship. More significantly, it offers a
practical check on those forces. It prevents irrational or abusive tax
schemes by rendering the makers of such schemes subject to them.
The view that equality is an empty idea rests on an unrealistic and
exaggerated view of the level of precision required in order for equality
to have meaning. The idea that we should rely on market efficiencies to
resolve equity concerns is a second best solution. Broad acceptance of
either view may serve to unwisely loosen the restraints on tax policy that
are at the core of a politically and morally acceptable tax system.

97. See id.
at 609-10.
98. But they are also sometimes deeply entrenched. The most notable example is the
acquisition-value property tax in California, which has now also taken root in Florida. See Miller,
supranote 36, at 142.

99. See Shaviro, supranote 81, at403.
100. For example, Musgrave makes an argument about vertical and horizontal equity -in a first
best setting where" political and other constraints do not exist. See Musgrave, supranote 44. at 354-

56.
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